Reassessing Claims of Strategic Vulnerability
Hossack & Lackenbauer: Zellen’s concerns about increasing Chinese activity in the Arctic and Russia’s “resurgent … appetite for foreign intervention” are compounded by his perception of Greenland’s strategic vulnerability.” (citing my “High Stakes in the High North: Alternative Models for Greenland’s Ongoing Constitutional and Political Transformation,” Nordicum Mediterraneum: Icelandic e-Journal of the Nordic and Mediterranean 16:2 (2021)).
Zellen: Hossack and Lackenbauer conflate the administration’s rationale—based on perceived external threats from China and Russia—with my own analysis, which focuses on internal dynamics in the Arctic. As noted, my article “High Stakes in the High North: Alternative Models for Greenland’s Ongoing Constitutional and Political Transformation” does not center on Greenland’s vulnerability or on specific threats from China or Russia.
Debates surrounding Greenland’s future must account for both its strategic importance and its evolving political agency, rather than reducing the issue to a singular narrative of vulnerability.
Rather, it examines Denmark’s limitations in developing a more representative model of Greenlandic political expression and considers alternative institutional arrangements relevant to Greenland’s aspirations for autonomy and independence. The article originated as a 2019 white paper, developed following my August 18, 2019 commentary in The Globe and Mail, “Donald Trump is thinking of buying Greenland. That’s not necessarily a bad idea.” The 2021 publication represents a revised and expanded version of that earlier work.
In this context, references to my article as evidence of a broader geopolitical argument tend to simplify its scope. My analysis distinguishes between external threat narratives and internal governance considerations, and is intended as a conceptual exploration rather than a policy prescription. While my article is cited multiple times, these references do not fully engage with its underlying argument, which emphasizes institutional and political dimensions rather than strategic threat assessments.
Independence Pathways and Strategic Options
Hossack & Lackenbauer: Greenlanders’ road to independence from the Kingdom of Denmark poses, in Zellen’s mind, a strategic vulnerability to North America: Greenland’s small population and economy make it a good target for “stealth invasion” by overseas actors seeking to create dependencies in the region (citing, again, my “High Stakes in the High North: Alternative Models for Greenland’s Ongoing Constitutional and Political Transformation,” Nordicum Mediterraneum: Icelandic e-Journal of the Nordic and Mediterranean 16:2 (2021)).
My analysis reflects broader considerations in international politics rather than a prescriptive argument.
Zellen: I view this less as a vulnerability and more as an opportunity to advance Greenlanders’ interests, particularly in alignment with broader hemispheric and continental dynamics. My analysis does not center on external threat scenarios, but rather on the structural challenges and opportunities associated with Greenland’s path toward independence.
As noted above, concerns about external influence—whether from China or Russia—are more characteristic of U.S. and allied policy discussions than of my own argument. In my earlier work, including analysis of Nunavut following its creation in 1999, I have considered how demographic and economic shifts could affect governance structures. In that context, the concern was less about state sovereignty than about the preservation of Indigenous political control within evolving institutional frameworks.
Hossack & Lackenbauer: As Greenland moves closer to independence, Zellen warns, it will require economic aid and partnerships, making it more vulnerable to pernicious external actors seeking to invest in Greenland’s resources and thus gain a foothold in the North American Arctic.
Zellen: As noted above, this concern reflects broader policy debates rather than my central argument. Economic development in the North is characterized by volatility, high costs, and long time horizons. Greenland, like other Arctic regions, will require external investment. However, with appropriate institutional safeguards, this does not necessarily translate into increased vulnerability to external actors.
Hossack & Lackenbauer: Zellen’s response to this is simple: Greenland should consider pursuing alternate forms of independence, with the favoured routes being to join with other North American states – Canada, Nunavut (proposing a “dual secession” creating a new, larger Indigenous state), and/or the United States (again citing my “High Stakes in the High North: Alternative Models for Greenland’s Ongoing Constitutional and Political Transformation,” Nordicum Mediterraneum: Icelandic e-Journal of the Nordic and Mediterranean 16:2 (2021)).
Zellen: Greenland should consider a range of institutional possibilities, including alternative constitutional arrangements beyond the current framework with Denmark. These options—while not necessarily preferred as they suggest—represent viable avenues that merit closer examination. They should be analyzed on their merits rather than dismissed in advance.
Greenland’s Strategic Position and Alliance Context
Hossack & Lackenbauer: By bringing Greenland fully within the North American sphere of influence, he insists, Greenland would continue to be protected by NATO and ensure the Northern flank of North America is not vulnerable through its European connections. Zellen insists that an independent Greenland with no economic prospects and no defensive alliances would make it a strategic vulnerability.
Zellen: I do not make this claim in the form presented here. My analysis reflects broader considerations in international politics rather than a prescriptive argument. Greenland has developed a nascent diplomatic presence, including representation in Washington, Beijing, and at NATO headquarters, alongside an evolving Arctic strategy and a foreign policy that balances Western alignment with an independent pursuit of national interests.
The principle of “Nothing About Us Without Us” reflects Greenland’s emphasis on political agency. Its leadership has sought to maintain relationships with key partners while retaining autonomy in strategic decision-making.
From a geopolitical perspective, North America’s northeastern flank has long been recognized as strategically significant due to its geography, proximity to major North Atlantic routes, and emerging economic and security considerations. Greenland’s location has historically been central to these dynamics, a reality that remains relevant under current conditions.
At the same time, Greenland has not indicated any intention to withdraw from its relationships with Western partners or from NATO. These connections continue to be viewed as compatible with its longer-term aspirations for independence.
Debates surrounding Greenland’s future must therefore account for both its strategic importance and its evolving political agency, rather than reducing the issue to a singular narrative of vulnerability.
Future-Oriented Strategy and Alliance Assumptions
Hossack & Lackenbauer: In this sense, his premise for revisionist action is future-oriented, predicated on what might happen as necessitating preventative action to secure American interests.
Zellen: My analysis is shaped in part by the renewed U.S. interest in Greenland, particularly under the Trump administration. This context is relevant to understanding the range of strategic options currently under discussion. Greenlanders must navigate these dynamics and consider a range of possible pathways in pursuing their political and economic objectives.
The characterization of this approach as “revisionist” reflects a broader disagreement over how Arctic policy should respond to changing geopolitical conditions. My argument is that forward-looking analysis—grounded in evolving realities—remains necessary when assessing long-term strategic interests.
Hossack & Lackenbauer: While ostensibly acknowledging Greenland’s right to self-determination and progress towards decolonization, Zellen both anticipates and echoes American defence analysts and officials who fear that an independent Greenland could choose neutrality or fail to join NATO, thus potentially denying the US critical access to the Pituffik Space Base and the strategically vital GIUK Gap.
Zellen: Greenland has generally sought to benefit economically from the Thule (now Pituffik) base, rather than to end the U.S. presence. The issue has been participation in its economic ecosystem rather than opposition to it.
In strategic terms, Iceland—rather than Greenland—has historically played a central role in the security of the GIUK Gap, given its geographic position relative to North Atlantic transit routes.
The claim that I “anticipate and echo” concerns about a neutral or non-aligned Greenland does not reflect my position. My work does not focus on the risk of Greenland departing from NATO, nor on scenarios involving the loss of U.S. access to Pituffik. Greenland’s own policy framework, including its 2024 Arctic strategy (Nothing About Us Without Us), reflects an approach that combines continued engagement with Western institutions and a degree of diplomatic flexibility.
More broadly, there has been little indication that Greenland seeks to disrupt existing security arrangements. Its approach has instead emphasized maintaining established partnerships while expanding its political and economic autonomy.
Greenlandic Agency, Decolonization, and Policy Narratives
Hossack & Lackenbauer: Rather than stating this explicitly, however, Zellen seeks to discredit longstanding relationships, suppress Greenlandic agency, and castigate Denmark as both a weak and destructive colonial power, all while trumpeting the alleged benevolence of the Trump Administration and the global power of the United States.
Zellen: I do not discredit longstanding relationships in my work, although I do critically assess specific policies where warranted. My analysis does not seek to suppress Greenlandic agency; rather, it aims to examine the institutional and political constraints that shape current discussions of sovereignty.
In particular, my work engages with the limitations of existing governance frameworks and considers alternative models of political and economic development, including those informed by land claims agreements such as ANCSA and subsequent Canadian frameworks. The objective is to expand the range of institutional possibilities available to Greenland in pursuing greater autonomy.
My argument does not rest on claims of benevolence, but on the alignment of interests between Indigenous communities and state structures, a theme developed in my work on Arctic exceptionalism. Within this context, renewed U.S. interest in Greenland represents a factor that may influence future political developments, and one that Greenlandic actors may choose to engage with in different ways.
Hossack & Lackenbauer: Greenland’s independence movement generally has followed a pragmatic approach marked by incremental legal milestones rather than revolutionary upheaval calling for breaks from European and North American allies and relationships. This peaceful pursuit is anchored in the securing of Home Rule in 1979, under which Greenland elected its own parliament (Inatsisartut) and government (Naalakkersuisut) for the first time (while maintaining their two seats in the Danish Parliament), and the Act on Greenland Self-Government in 2009 which explicitly recognizes Greenlanders as a people under international law with the right to self-determination. This framework provides a clear, democratic pathway to independence, stipulating that any decision to secede rests with the Greenlandic people and must be followed by negotiations with the Danish government.
Zellen: I recognize this historical trajectory and the incremental process through which Greenland has advanced toward greater autonomy. However, this framework was developed under conditions that differ from the current geopolitical environment.
Recent developments in the Arctic have introduced new strategic and economic dynamics that may affect how these pathways are evaluated. In this context, the existing model of gradual transition may coexist with alternative approaches reflecting evolving regional conditions.
At the same time, questions have been raised regarding the timing and substance of past policy decisions, including the late formal recognition of Greenlanders as a distinct people in 2009, and more recent efforts to address colonial excesses with an historic apology. These issues have been discussed in relation to broader debates on colonial policy and its long-term social consequences. I address these themes in several commentaries, including at The Arctic Institute, Washington Times, American Thinker, and Arctic Today
From Demilitarization to Strategic Reassessment
Hossack & Lackenbauer: Traditionally, Greenland’s political leadership emphasized the idea of “peaceful Inuit” and some envisaged their island as a future demilitarized zone, downplaying military or security concerns to focus on achieving fiscal self-sustainability.
Zellen: Through a critical lens, the characterization of Inuit societies as “peaceful” can be interpreted as reflecting external perspectives shaped by historical processes of dependency and cultural transformation. These processes have included policies affecting traditional livelihoods and social organization across Arctic regions.
A demilitarized Arctic was more plausible under Cold War and immediate post-Cold War conditions, when geography and climate reinforced the region’s role as a buffer zone. This was reflected in initiatives such as those associated with Mikhail Gorbachev, who advocated cooperative approaches to Arctic governance. However, these conditions have changed as the Arctic becomes more accessible and strategically relevant, increasing its role in international competition.
On the question of fiscal self-sustainability, Danish policy has also been subject to criticism, particularly in relation to historical population policies and their long-term social effects. I discuss these issues in several commentaries, as I cited above.
Iceland has similarly cultivated a pacifist tradition, with a minimalist armed force represented by the Icelandic Coast Guard (Landhelgisgæslan) of approximately 160–200 personnel, which famously confronted the British fleet during the Cod Wars; Canada, for its part, has developed extensive public health and unemployment insurance systems (“on the pogey,” as it is locally known), supported in part by a security framework in which territorial defense has relied on broader alliance structures, including American military protection.
These arrangements have contributed to ongoing debates within the United States regarding burden-sharing in transatlantic security and have informed recent efforts within NATO to encourage member states to meet agreed defense spending commitments. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent announcement of increased investment in Arctic defense infrastructure can be understood within this broader context.
Visions of an Arctic demilitarized zone were closely linked to longstanding U.S. defense commitments to Greenland, Iceland, and Canada. At the same time, these arrangements coincided with domestic debates in the United States over the allocation of resources between external security commitments and internal social and economic priorities. As strategic conditions evolve, these dynamics are being reassessed.
In this context, renewed attention to Arctic policy reflects both changing geopolitical realities and a re-evaluation of the role of U.S. power in shaping regional outcomes, including the longer historical trajectory of Arctic development since the Alaska Purchase.
