Due Process for Asylum Seekers Is Not a Border Privilege

Due process for asylum seekers cannot depend on where a government draws its line, and the record of error and comparative law shows why.

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The border fence does not stop at the shoreline, and neither should the question of who is owed a fair hearing. Photo: Tony Webster (CC BY 2.0)

Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil man from Sri Lanka, was arrested 25 yards inside the southern border of the United States and placed in expedited removal. He said he had been abducted and beaten in Sri Lanka, and his claim of credible fear was rejected. In 2020 the Supreme Court held that an applicant at the threshold of entry is owed only the process Congress has written into statute.

That holding rests on a premise worth examining: a person’s standing before the law depends on which side of a line the government says he occupies. This essay argues the opposite. Due process for asylum seekers cannot depend on geography, because an asylum claim asks whether this person may lawfully be sent into danger, and that question deserves a fair answer wherever it is asked.

The Border Fiction and Its Century of Precedent

American law sorts noncitizens into two groups. Those who have entered the country receive due process, and those treated as still outside it receive whatever Congress provides. The Court stated the second rule in Knauff, decided in January 1950: for a person denied entry, the procedure Congress authorizes is the process that is due. Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Justices Black and Frankfurter.

The first group has older roots. In 1903 the Court held in the Japanese Immigrant Case that an executive officer cannot deport an immigrant who has entered and settled without giving her a chance to be heard. In 1982 it extended due process to a lawful permanent resident returning from a brief trip, and remanded her case to be tested under the balancing approach of Landon v. Plasencia.

That approach comes from Mathews v. Eldridge, which asks three questions: how much the individual has at stake, how likely the existing procedure is to produce error, and what added safeguards would cost the government. None of them mentions territory. The entry fiction answers them in advance by declaring that the person at the line has nothing at stake that the law recognizes, however grave the harm he says he fears.

A Rule That Turns on Twenty-Five Yards

The majority’s reasoning in 2020 deserves a fair statement. Justice Alito grounded it in more than a century of precedent holding that decisions of executive officers on initial entry are final, and he warned that letting courts review every facet of every asylum claim would clog expedited removal. The concern is institutional, not cruel. The question is whether it can coexist with due process for asylum seekers.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented, warning that denials of asylum claims in expedited removal had become functionally unreviewable. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in the judgment and stressed how narrow it was: a man arrested 25 yards from the border who received the process as designed. Notice what the doctrine now asks a court to decide: whether twenty-five yards counts as arrival.

In June 2026 the Court went further outward. In Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, decided six to three, it held that a person stopped on the Mexican side of the border has not arrived in the United States under the asylum statute, so officials may turn asylum seekers back before they set foot on American soil. The Court decided the statutory question and declined to reach the constitutional one.

Why Due Process for Asylum Seekers Attaches to the Claim

An asylum claim is not a request for a favor. It asserts that sending this person back would expose him to persecution, a risk that international refugee law treats as a bar to return. The decision therefore determines whether someone will be delivered to danger. Procedural fairness exists to guard against error in exactly that kind of decision, and the claimant alone knows what happened to him.

Due process for asylum seekers cannot turn on a line on the map, because the government that draws it is the same one whose decision is in dispute.

Asylum claims also differ from most administrative claims in what they require the claimant to prove. Many people flee without documents, and the case often turns on whether an adjudicator believes the account. Thuraissigiam alleged that he had no competent interpreter and no chance to present country conditions. Whatever one thinks of his claim, due process for asylum seekers must include a hearing in a language the claimant speaks.

Apply those three questions to due process for asylum seekers without the entry fiction and the answers come quickly. The claimant’s interest is as grave as any the law recognizes: life, bodily safety, and liberty. The government’s interest is real, and it includes speed, cost, and the integrity of the system. But those interests argue about the design of a procedure. They cannot justify having no procedure worth the name.

The remaining question is how often the existing procedure errs, and here the record is empirical rather than speculative. Two bodies of research, one on decision-makers and one on lawyers, show that the outcome of an asylum case depends heavily on factors that have nothing to do with the merits of the claim.

What the Record Shows About Error

Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag analyzed asylum decisions at every level of the American system and published their findings in 2007 under the title Refugee Roulette. In one regional asylum office, 60 percent of the officers decided claims from Chinese applicants at rates more than 50 percent away from the region’s average, and some officers granted asylum to none.

The immigration courts showed the same pattern: half of the Miami judges deviated by more than 50 percent from the court’s mean grant rate in Colombian cases. The authors did not recommend quotas. They proposed more comprehensive training and more effective, independent appellate review to professionalize the system.

Representation matters at least as much. Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer studied immigration court records from 2007 to 2012 and found that only 37 percent of immigrants had a lawyer, and only 14 percent of those detained. Among immigrants never detained who sought relief, 63 percent of the represented obtained it, against 13 percent of the unrepresented. Counsel was also associated with fewer unmeritorious claims.

The pattern has worsened. A 2025 update covering almost eight million cases found that representation among nondetained respondents fell from 66 percent to 57 percent, and among the growing backlog of pending cases from 47 percent in 2012 to 31 percent in 2024. A system that errs unpredictably and withholds the safeguard associated with better outcomes does not deliver due process for asylum seekers.

Representation studies measure association, not causation, because lawyers may take stronger cases. The disparities among adjudicators do not depend on that caveat, since applicants from the same country, with the same kind of claim, fared very differently before different officers and judges in the same office or court.

Canada, Latin America, and the Right to Have Rights

Other legal systems have declined the territorial premise. In Singh, decided on April 4, 1985, three justices of the Supreme Court of Canada led by Bertha Wilson held that the Charter’s guarantee of fundamental justice covers every human being physically present in Canada, and the Court ruled for refugee claimants whose cases had been decided largely on paper. Presence, not citizenship or admission, triggered the guarantee.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights approached the question differently. In Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, on migrant children, it listed ten guarantees for immigration proceedings, among them notice of the proceedings, free interpretation, legal representation, a reasoned decision, and an appeal with suspensive effect. The opinion concerns children, and nothing in it says each guarantee reaches adults.

The same opinion is explicit about the frontier. The prohibition on return covers expelling, deporting, or rejecting a child at the border when life, security, or liberty is at risk, and it extends to transfer to a third state that could send the child onward. A state that rejects at the border without a fair hearing cannot know whether it is breaching that prohibition. Procedure is how it finds out.

Hannah Arendt saw the underlying problem in 1951. In The Origins of Totalitarianism she argued that stateless people discovered the rights of man belonged in practice to citizens, and she named what they lacked the right to have rights. Ayten Gündoğdu’s Rightlessness in an Age of Rights applies that diagnosis to contemporary migrants, whose claims are heard only if someone with power chooses to hear them.

The Sovereignty Objection

The strongest objection is structural. A state decides whom to admit, and extending full process to everyone who reaches its territory invites claims made to buy time. The Court reasoned that once a person asserts fear, a hearing would follow and the removal would no longer be expedited. On this view, the border fiction is a rational filter, and its costs fall on people who chose to cross irregularly.

Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice gives the objection its best philosophical form. Admission and exclusion, he argued, lie at the core of communal self-determination, and a political community may decide who joins it. Yet Walzer also accepted a duty of mutual aid toward strangers in dire need, refugees among them. That duty creates the opening: a state cannot discharge it without first learning who is fleeing danger, and only a fair procedure can tell it.

Three Replies to the Objection

The objection has force, but it proves less than it claims. First, due process for asylum seekers is a floor, not a trial: the three-factor test itself calibrates the process to the stakes and the cost. Second, the data above show that counsel is associated with fewer unmeritorious claims, so quality at the first instance can reduce the burden the objection fears. Third, the doctrine’s own line is unstable.

In May 2025 the Court held in A.A.R.P. v. Trump that the Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens to due process in removal, and that roughly 24 hours’ notice, with no information on how to contest removal, does not suffice. Those detainees were already inside the country. So was Thuraissigiam, and the only difference was a legal fiction about arrival.

That is the deepest flaw in the border fiction. Due process for asylum seekers cannot turn on a line on the map, because the government that draws it is the same one whose decision is in dispute. A rule built on such a line protects some people and not others arbitrarily.

A Floor That Does Not Depend on Geography

A workable floor for due process for asylum seekers, in my proposal, has three parts. First, notice in a language the person understands, explaining how to contest removal. Second, access to a lawyer or accredited representative before the decisive interview, with state-funded legal information for those who cannot pay. Third, review by a decision-maker independent of the one who rejected the claim. None demands a full trial.

Each element of due process for asylum seekers answers evidence already in the record. Notice answers the Court’s recent holding that a day’s warning is empty without information on how to object. Counsel answers the representation gap and its association with outcomes. Independent review answers the disparities among adjudicators, which researchers proposed to address through training and appellate oversight rather than quotas.

What the Floor Leaves to the State

None of this settles who qualifies. Governments remain free to deny claims, set evidentiary standards, and remove people whose claims fail after a fair hearing. A floor for due process for asylum seekers regulates how a decision is made, not what it decides, and for that reason it leaves intact the sovereignty the objection invokes: the power to say no, exercised after the person has been heard.

Some will say this asks too much of governments already stretched by arrivals. But unfair process carries a political cost as well. Europe is testing these questions under its new asylum system, and the debate over whether migration is a permanent constitutional crisis shows how much rides on procedure. So does the politics of sanctuary and immigrant rights in the United States.

A state may decide whom to admit. It cannot make the question of who may be sent to danger disappear by drawing a line and declaring the person on the far side a nonperson before the law. Arendt’s lesson was that rights without a place to claim them are only a hope, and due process for asylum seekers is how a legal order shows it has a place.

Selected Readings

Book cover: Asylum Is Unavailable by Stephen George Damianos
Book cover: Undoing Nothing by Paolo Boccagni
Book cover: The Migrant's Jail by Brianna Nofil
Book cover: Inside Asylum Appeals by Nick Gill et al.
Book cover: Judging Refugees by Anthea Vogl

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